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THE FEATHERS OF THE EAGLE
C
ontemporary culture is built on appropriation. With 
digital technology, it has become ever easier for consumers to 
reuse and manipulate images. Like other consumer-producers, 
artists use Photoshop and other widely available editing 
programs—though the most commonly practised form of appropriation 
is still the act of channel-hopping, creating unforeseen and ephemeral 
combinations of images at the touch of a tv remote control.1 Nicolas 
Bourriaud has argued that in today’s digitized culture of browsing, 
sampling, ﬁle-sharing and photoshopping, we are almost all ‘semi-
onauts’ who ‘produce original pathways through signs’.2 If this is true, 
then what is the value of these millions of ‘original pathways’? Though 
digitization is often presented as heralding the end of the standardiza-
tions associated with modern mass media, could it end up reinforcing 
them? Might the ‘pathways’ it produces turn out to be interchangeable 
consumerist trajectories? 
The term ‘Appropriation Art’, which emerged around 1980 to character-
ize work by artists such as Richard Prince and Sherrie Levine, has clear 
intimations of transgression and illegality. Yet by now the art in ques-
tion is historical, some of its practitioners have become blue-chip artists, 
and the critical claims made for appropriation as an artistic strategy in 
the late 1970s and 1980s have met serious objections. If the culture 
industry is based to a signiﬁcant degree on the appropriation of mate-
rial from art and various subcultures, as well as from different historical 
epochs and cultures, why should appropriation as an artistic strategy 
have special status? Even in 1982, Douglas Crimp—one of the main 
defenders of appropriation art—noted that ‘if all aspects of culture use 
this new operation, then the operation itself cannot indicate a speciﬁc 
reﬂection upon the culture’.3 Early claims for the inherently critical cast 
of appropriation were themselves too abstract and uncritical, much like 
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Bourriaud’s sampling utopia. In a culture in which materials are every-
where appropriated and re-appropriated, how can appropriation as such 
be intrinsically progressive? 
Recently, Isabelle Graw has pointed out that Appropriation Art the-
ory has often—in spite of the post-structuralist critique of originality 
and authorship—treated the appropriating artist as a fully conscious, 
detached and critical subject, thus denying that the appropriated material 
may have a hold on the artist, acknowledged or otherwise, inﬂuencing 
the outcome of the appropriation. Graw has noted that Richard Prince, 
the alleged inventor of re-photography, took pictures of photographic 
images in such a way as to give the result a seamless quality and operate 
subtle modiﬁcations: in Prince’s early re-photographed advertisements, 
the interiors, watches and pens seem to possess an uncanny lustre.4 His 
re-photographed Marlboro ads are devoid of logotype and text, leaving 
only photographic images of cowboys; while the ‘critical’ imperative of 
art world discourse ensures that this is seen as a reﬂection on mascu-
linity and visual culture, the cliché hardly loses its power altogether—it 
remains as compelling and seductive as the pens and watches.
The same could be said of Prince’s notorious Spiritual America, a re-
photographed picture of a naked, pre-pubescent Brooke Shields ﬁrst 
shown in 1984 as the sole work in a makeshift gallery. The use of this 
image made at least one early supporter of Prince extremely uncom-
fortable, leading to a break-up with the artist because he seemed 
‘mesmerized’ by the image. Regardless of the exact ratio of fascination 
and critical detachment in Prince’s use of this image, it is obvious that 
such an appropriation and presentation could hardly be free from some 
measure of libidinal investment.5
1 Fittingly, the artist Johan Grimonprez, whose Dial h-i-s-t-o-r-y (1997) recounts 
the rise of hijacking with the use of (mainly) appropriated footage, has also charted 
the history of the remote control. See www.zapomatik.com.
2 Nicolas Bourriaud, Postproduction, New York 2000, p. 12.
3 Douglas Crimp, ‘Appropriating Appropriation’ (1982), in On the Museum’s Ruins, 
Cambridge, ma 1993, pp. 126–37.
4 Isabelle Graw, ‘Dedication Replacing Appropriation: Fascination, Subversion and 
Dispossession in Appropriation Art’, in George Baker, Jack Bankowsky et al, Louise 
Lawler and Others, Ostﬁldern-Ruit 2004, pp. 45–67.
5 ‘Spiritual America: David Deitcher on Pre-Teen Spirit’, Artforum, October 2004, 
pp. 89–90, 278, 281.
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Graw’s text is part of a recent re-examination of Appropriation Art—
and the accompanying discourse, with its blind spots and limitations.6 
Such a renewed investigation is a necessary step towards a reappraisal 
of the possibilities and pitfalls of appropriation, and the development 
of a tactical approach, rather than an essentialist stance that assumes 
appropriation to be inherently critical. But the net should be cast wider, 
beyond its American exponents of the late seventies and early eighties. 
For there is an under-examined aspect of the history of appropriation: 
its recurrent conception as a mythological practice. As we shall see, this 
neglected genealogy highlights both its urgency as an artistic strategy, 
and the problems with which it is fraught.
Barthesian thefts
Around 1980, Richard Prince and Sherrie Levine ‘re-photographed’, 
respectively, contemporary ads and historical masterpieces of photogra-
phy, while Louise Lawler photographed works of art installed in museums 
or collectors’ homes, or at auction houses. Critics—most notably Douglas 
Crimp and Hal Foster—regarded these artists as Barthesian mythologists 
who ‘steal’ and subvert media myths: ‘Drawn to pictures whose status is 
that of a cultural myth, Levine discloses that status and its psychological 
resonances through the imposition of very simple strategies . . . [she] 
steals them away from their usual place in our cultures and subverts 
their mythologies’.7 Although it may be slightly crude, this Barthesian 
discourse—by now part of appropriation art’s history—can also serve as 
the starting point for a more differentiated discussion.
As is well known, the ‘myths’ studied and criticized by Barthes in 
Mythologies (1957) were examples in the media of a bourgeois ideology 
that transformed history into nature, hijacking signs and giving them a 
saturated surplus meaning. Myth was a second-degree semiotic system 
grafted onto a ﬁrst-degree one. The image of a black soldier saluting, pre-
sumably before the French ﬂag, had a second, ‘mythical’ meaning beyond 
the literal one: it signiﬁed that France was a great nation, its principles 
6 On (a recent reconstruction of) Douglas Crimp’s Pictures exhibition, see David 
Rimanelli, ‘Signs of the Time’ and Scott Rothkopf, ‘Hit or Myth’, in Artforum, 
October 2001, pp. 130–34. See also the appropriation issue of Texte zur Kunst, no. 
46 (June 2002).
7 Douglas Crimp, ‘Pictures’ (1977/79), in Brian Wallis, ed., Art after Modernism: 
Rethinking Representation, New York and Boston 1984, p. 185.
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were universal, and people of different races gladly pledged allegiance to 
it.8 Barthes deﬁned his mythology as a synthesis of two sciences: semiol-
ogy and ideology—the latter possessing a historical dimension, unlike 
semiology.9 Founded during the French Revolution by Destutt de Tracy 
to enable rational inquiry into the human mind and ideas, the science of 
ideology was a fruit of the Enlightenment’s reassessment of knowledge 
and beliefs. Ideology’s roots ‘lie deep in the Enlightenment dream of a 
world entirely transparent to reason, free of the prejudice, superstition 
and obscurantism of the ancien régime’.10
Yet, of course, the term ‘ideology’ came to stand for the opposite, in the 
curious inversion of meaning that seems to beset words ending in ‘-ology’, 
as Terry Eagleton has pointed out: psychology has become a synonym for 
psyche, and ideology has come to stand for dogmatic beliefs and false 
consciousness—the very things that should be investigated by ‘ideolo-
gists’. Sometimes the two meanings coexist: ‘psychology’ can refer both 
to the psyche and to the discipline devoted to the study of it; ‘mythology’ 
can mean both a group of myths and the systematic study of myths and 
mythologies (in the ﬁrst sense of the term). It is no coincidence that 
the eighteenth century saw the rise of a discipline of mythology as the 
critical study of myths. The Enlightenment needed myth as its other, or 
negative Doppelgänger. While mythology as a discipline deals primarily 
with myths in ancient Greece, Egypt or contemporary non-Western cul-
tures, ideology is the science of the modern, apparently post-mythical 
world. If this was a discourse that often led to various depreciations of 
non-Western cultures, it could also lead to a critique of Western culture 
itself. To someone like Destutt de Tracy—who wrote an extensive text 
about that monument of French Enlightenment mythology, Dupuis’s 
Origine de tous les cultes—it was painfully clear that irrational religious 
sentiments and political misconceptions were far from extinct.11 Hence 
it is also not surprising that Barthes positions himself as a mythologist 
of modern media.
Some time ago, when the Kunst-Werke in Berlin planned an exhibi-
tion on ‘Mythos raf’—devoted to artistic and media responses to the 
8 Roland Barthes, Mythologies [1957], Paris 1970, p. 189.
9 Barthes, Mythologies, p. 185.
10 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction, London and New York 1991, p. 64.
11 Antoine-Louis-Claude Destutt de Tracy, Analyse raisonnée de ‘l’Origine de tous les 
cultes ou Religion Universelle’; Ouvrage publié en l’an iii, par Dupuis, Citoyen français, 
Paris 1804.
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Red Army Faction—the German press and political elite went into a 
state of collective hysteria, having apparently read the term ‘myth’ not 
in Barthes’s sense but in line with the Romantic view of it as a poetic 
force sadly lacking in the modern world. From this point of view, speak-
ing of the myth of the raf seemed tantamount to glorifying terrorism. 
But while Romantic ideas of mythology generally look back to histori-
cal examples, bemoaning their absence in the modern age, the tradition 
descending from the Enlightenment sees myth everywhere. Here the 
idea of myth, as the Other of reason, increasingly loses its moorings in 
concrete narratives about gods or heroes, issuing into a generic concep-
tion according to which anything can become a myth or be infected by 
it. Adorno and Horkheimer deploy a particularly grim version of this 
idea in their famous analysis of the reversal of modern rationality into 
myth; Barthes sees ‘bourgeois myth’ everywhere in the 1950s media. 
At a certain point in Mythologies, he remarks that our mentality is still 
pre-Voltairean; it is, in other words, still riddled with myth, and a second 
Enlightenment is needed.12 But Barthes is also close to Lévi-Straussian 
structuralism and the notion that some sort of logic, however harm-
ful, is inherent in ‘mythic thought’, which can therefore be submitted 
to structural analysis.
By presenting his Mythologies project as part of a second Enlightenment, 
Barthes appears to subscribe to a simplistic ideal of complete rationality 
and ‘transparent communication’, seeing the Other of reason as some-
thing to be completely eradicated. However, in the end he develops a 
more dialectical model of a practice that involves hijacking myth in its 
turn. ‘Since myth robs us, why not rob myth?’13 This would result in 
a ‘true mythology’, Barthes claims, and one can scarcely wonder that 
the defenders of Appropriation Art have latched onto this, since this 
‘true mythology’ could be an artistic as well as a theoretical project. One 
of his most important models, after all, was a literary one—Flaubert’s 
last unﬁnished novel, Bouvard et Pécuchet, perhaps the book he invoked 
most often throughout his career. Barthes presents this sardonic por-
trayal of a certain segment of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie as an 
experimental ‘second-degree myth’.14 With the mature Flaubert, liter-
ary composition became a matter of re-writing, copying, appropriating. 
12 Barthes, Mythologies, p. 63.
13 Barthes, Mythologies, p. 209; quoted by Hal Foster in a discussion of appropria-
tion art in Recodings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics, Seattle 1985, p. 169.
14 Barthes, Mythologies, pp. 209–10.
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Breaking with the romantic model of the writer as a divinely inspired 
seer, he developed a merciless art of second-degree writing by quoting 
and paraphrasing material from a wide variety of sources. But whereas 
Flaubert’s attitude was one of conservative, sneering retreat, Barthes 
tried to turn Flaubertian language-theft into a progressive strategy.
Barthes’s list of terms and their deﬁnitions in Mythologies is clearly mod-
elled in part on the Dictionnaire des idées reçues, a catalogue of clichés 
that Bouvard and Pécuchet were presumably to compile from various 
sources at the end of Flaubert’s unﬁnished novel, recording the human 
follies in which they themselves indulged so freely. In the Dictionnaire, 
clichés of the nineteenth-century bourgeois Weltanschauung are distilled 
into sardonically minimal sentences. In Mythologies, Barthes clearly 
attempted something similar with his enumeration of cyclists and the 
‘African Grammar’ (‘God.—Sublimated form of the French govern-
ment’).15 Through his use of Flaubert, Barthes hints at a true mythology 
in which logos and mythos criticize, transform and liberate each other. 
Mythologies does not claim to be an example of this ‘true mythology’. It 
is a vision of something else, of a practice that goes beyond Mythologies, 
a promised land occasionally glimpsed but perhaps never to be reached. 
Appropriation art too is more promise than achievement; it can only 
hope to achieve at least some degree of success if it is as obsessive as 
Flaubert’s œuvre, and follows a less than transparent logic.
Divine spirit, conquest, imperialism
Appropriation Art’s link with Barthesian mythology does not begin in 
New York in the late 1970s. Marcel Broodthaers’s seminal exhibition 
Der Adler vom Oligozän bis heute (The Eagle from the Oligocene to the 
Present), held in Düsseldorf in 1972, was a direct artistic response to the 
challenge posed by Mythologies by an artist who, according to his contem-
poraries, studied Barthes’s book extensively. The exhibition—consisting 
of the Section des Figures of his Musée d’Art Moderne, Département des 
Aigles—contained numerous images of eagles in all media, two- and 
three-dimensional, from various eras and ranging from high art to 
kitsch. The eagle is a creature of the air laden with mythical connotations 
but also a real animal, not merely a product of the mythopoeic imagina-
tion. Zeus’s pet is perfect material for demonstrating how an object can 
be appropriated by myth and subjected to ‘always the same meaning on 
15 Barthes, Mythologies, p. 130.
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different levels—comparable to the circles of a bird in ﬂight: grandeur, 
authority, power. Divine spirit. Spirit of conquest. Imperialism.’16 At the 
1972 Documenta, the exhibition was followed by the Section Publicité 
of the Musée d’Art Moderne, which contained photos and slide projec-
tions of eagles on various products. In his article ‘Adler Pfeife Urinoir’ 
(Eagle, Pipe, Urinal)—of which Broodthaers published an extract in 
the catalogue of his eagle show—the anthropologist Michael Oppitz 
explained that the German Mark had a ‘mythical surplus value’ that 
made it embody German prosperity or the Wirtschaftswunder. The Mark 
of course sported the Bundesadler, the federal eagle. Oppitz claims that 
Broodthaers ‘defuses’ the mythical power of the eagle by multiplying 
eagles and also showing the ‘weak derivatives’ of the German national 
emblem in the logotypes of various organizations and wrappings for 
‘deutsche Markenprodukte’. ‘In the constant interconnections sug-
gested by the serial arrangement, the eagles are made to part with their 
mythical feathers.’ 17
Broodthaers concurred with this reading, but noted that the mythic eagle 
was alive and well in advertising: ‘The language of advertising targets 
the unconscious of the spectator–consumer, and so the magical eagle 
regains his power . . . I have pulled some feathers from the mythical 
eagle. But in advertising it remains intact, as aggressive as is necessary.’18 
He also provided the kind of statement of intent that is appreciated by 
those who like their art critical: ‘It can be easily ascertained that I wanted 
to neutralize the use-value of the eagle symbol, to reduce it to its zero 
degree in order to introduce a critical dimension into the history and 
use of this symbol.’19 This is the stern theoretical face of Broodthaers. 
But his amassment of eagles is also an absurd and hilarious exercise 
of a Flaubertian type. Having absorbed Barthes’s ideology critique, 
Broodthaers tried to create a ‘true mythology’ that would use the exhibi-
tion space and catalogue as second-degree media in which the poetic 
becomes critical and vice versa.
16 Marcel Broodthaers, ‘Section des ﬁgures’ (1972), in Anna Hakkens, ed., Marcel 
Broodthaers par lui-même, Ghent 1998, p. 90.
17 Michael Oppitz, ‘Adler Pfeife Urinoir’, in Der Adler vom Oligozän bis heute, 
vol. 2, Düsseldorf 1972, pp. 20–21. This extract has been stripped of the more 
‘technical’ Barthesian parts. The complete text (signed Mark Oppitz) appeared in 
Interfunktionen no. 9 (1972), pp. 177–80.
18 Broodthaers, ‘Section des ﬁgures’, p. 91.
19 Broodthaers, ‘Le Degré zéro’ (1973), in Hakkens, Broodthaers, p. 95.
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In analysing myth, Barthes focused on the additive aspect: myth is as 
it were grafted onto a text or image that remains outwardly intact.20 Yet 
such an addition is also a negation; it cancels actual or potential mean-
ings that do not square with the naturalizing tendency of myth. The 
result is an outwardly identical second sign that is inﬂected by mythical 
connotations; the historicity and complexity of the—hypothetical—ﬁrst 
representation is largely undone. In turn, intimations of a ‘true mythol-
ogy’ would have to negate the coherence and closure of myth and 
(re)introduce different meanings. But this would not necessarily lead to 
literal appropriation.
Photographs and readymades
In Mythologies Barthes analyses images as well as writings, but just as 
there are no long quotations, there are no illustrations, no direct visual 
appropriations. The images are represented only through descriptions.
But then Barthes advocated stealing myths rather than speciﬁc images 
or texts. If a true mythology is a meta-language that uses myth as its 
signiﬁed, this does not necessarily mean that texts or images have 
to be used wholesale. The mythologist might, on the contrary, want 
to extract the myth from its host or hosts and condense it into a few 
lines or paragraphs. Yet one can defend the interpretation of appropria-
tion in Barthesian terms. Placing an image or a text—or a fragment of 
one—in a new context can make the myth which it ‘hosts’ explicit. This 
kind of practice became common in visual art rather than in literature, 
once the avant-garde had made the simple ‘taking’ of a pre-existing 
object or image a valid artistic act. It can be argued that photography 
served as an important model for this: the camera facilitates the two-
dimensional appropriation of objects, and in this respect Duchamp’s 
readymades can be seen as a radical manifestation of a culture informed 
by photography.21
In later writings, particularly in ‘Eléments de sémiologie’ (1964), 
Barthes recasts the distinction between ﬁrst- and second-degree (mythi-
cal) semiological systems as the difference between denotation and 
20 Barthes, Mythologies, pp. 194–204.
21 On photography and the readymade see Rosalind Krauss, ‘Notes on the Index: 
Part 1’ in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, Cambridge, 
ma 1985, pp. 196–209.
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connotation.22 This is also the idiom of the famous reading of photo-
graphic ideology in pasta advertisements that he developed in ‘Rhetoric 
of the Image’, an essay of the same year. According to Barthes, photo-
graphs appear at ﬁrst sight to be pure denotation, identical to ‘things as 
they are’. Connotation is disguised by the illusion that the photographic 
image is completely natural. In this sense photography is the mythic 
medium par excellence; indeed, one could posit photography as the basis 
of Barthes’s model in Mythologies, which employs the ﬁction of a purely 
denotative ﬁrst-degree sign that is then ‘infected’ by mythical connota-
tions. In photography, Barthes showed that connotation is introduced 
through cropping, composition and captions—as in the Panzani pasta 
advertisements, where everything is made to signify a cliché of ‘Italian-
ness’.23 When ﬁrst published, ‘Rhetoric of the Image’ was accompanied 
by a full-page colour plate of the advertisement: in the era of Pop Art 
and Situationist détournements, Barthes revealed himself a re-photogra-
pher avant la lettre, who underscored his analysis by appropriating the 
image in question. Artistic appropriation then as it were scraps Barthes’s 
analysis (or takes it as read), its effect mainly depending on changes 
of context. Re-photography and other forms of photo-based appropria-
tion turn photography’s naturalizing tendency against itself by making 
apparent the images’ constructed and coded character.
In the catalogue to the 1972 eagle exhibition, Broodthaers acknowledged 
Duchamp’s readymades—as well as Magritte’s famous pipe painting—
as crucial precursors. While modernist movements tried to purge art 
of representational elements, foregrounding the formal properties of 
the visual sign, readymades are ordinary objects which serve as their 
own representation through alteration of context and negation of their 
original function; in the process they accrue strangely solipsistic surplus 
meanings. A subcategory of Duchamp’s readymades consists of appro-
priated industrial images such as the kitsch landscape print of Pharmacy 
(1914) or the Mona Lisa postcard of L. H. O. O. Q. (1919). Here, the 
negated and represented element is already a representation, already 
the negation of presence. Broodthaers too used images as readymades, 
22 Barthes, ‘Eléments de sémiologie’, in Communications, no. 4 (1964), pp. 91–134. 
See also, in the bibliography of this publication, the description of the project of 
Mythologies as a theory of mass media myths deﬁned as ‘des langages connotés’ 
(p. 137). Barthes is one of the authors of this bibliography, and is no doubt respon-
sible for this subtle reformulation of his earlier project.
23 Barthes, ‘Rhétorique de l’image’, in Communications, pp. 40–51.
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but the image-readymades in the Section des Figures in Düsseldorf were 
sometimes quite rare and precious objects. Broodthaers clearly enjoyed 
combining them as photographic reproductions in the catalogue, and 
when he moved on to the Section Publicité at the 1972 Documenta, pho-
tography became dominant. The assembly of largely ‘original’ eagle 
artefacts was replaced by a slide show and mounted photographs. With 
the Section Publicité, Broodthaers moved further away from the appro-
priation of images as objects to the appropriation of images through 
photography (or in some cases re-photography).
Art which aims to reﬂect on media myths by a conceptual use of photog-
raphy risks becoming mythiﬁed itself. The myth it embodies is that of a 
‘critical’ art which a priori differs from other commodiﬁed images. This 
quasi-Barthesian misconception accompanied classical Appropriation 
Art, and is still alive and well: when the raf exhibition ﬁnally opened in 
Berlin—re-christened Zur Vorstellung des Terrors (Representing Terror)—
the critic Tom Holert took the curators to task for presenting the artist 
Hans-Peter Feldmann as the prototype for practitioners who take on 
myth by ‘singling out’, ‘monumentalizing’, ‘reprivatizing’, ‘ﬁltering’ 
and ‘distancing’ what the media produce. The effect, he thought, was to 
idealize the relation between art and mass media.24 Here a Situationist 
critique of the art world was required: by pretending to ‘purify’ media 
images, art disavows its own implication in spectacle. While the current 
art world freely indulges in Situationist chic, its art of negation—which 
uses and perverts Barthes and Broodthaers by assuming its appropria-
tions are automatically critical, has forgotten this lesson.
Decodings
In 1957, when they were still members of the Lettrist International, 
future Situationists Guy Debord and Gil Wolman wrote a ‘user’s manual’ 
for détournements, in which they distanced the practice from (neo) Dada 
appropriations:
The literary and artistic heritage of humanity should be used for partisan 
propaganda purposes. It is, of course, necessary to go beyond any idea of 
scandal. Since opposition to the bourgeois notion of art and artistic genius 
has become pretty much old hat, [Duchamp] drawing a moustache on the 
24 Tom Holert, ‘Enzyklopädisches Sammelsurium’, Jungle World, no. 6, 9 February 
2005, available at www.jungle-world.com.
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Mona Lisa is no more interesting than the original version of that painting. 
We must now push this process to the point of negating the negation.25
For the si the re-representation of images in an artistic context would 
only mean their integration into an art world that is itself part of spec-
tacle; the détournement of texts and images in pamphlets, magazines or 
posters had to go beyond this. While artists like Broodthaers wanted to 
use the art world as a subdivision of spectacle for the production of diver-
gent, mutant, self-critical commodities, the Situationists demanded the 
negation of art itself as one prerequisite for an end to the spectacle.
Spectacle is deﬁned by Debord as representation; life has ‘distanced itself 
in a representation’, the spectacle of commodities.26 In this sense, not 
only Duchamp’s appropriated images but all of his readymades would 
be representations, or at least elements within the spectacle as the hiero-
glyphic transcription of social relations. Representation became a highly 
suspect notion in the twentieth century—largely because it seemed to 
presuppose obedience to a pre-given reality, with signs passively ‘reﬂect-
ing’ objects. This, it was widely felt, was to naturalize culture. With 
Barthes, denotation by and large stands in for representation. In contrast 
to more naive conceptions of the latter, here denotation can never exist 
in utopian purity, but is always accompanied by mythic connotations.27 
However, not all concepts of representation assume a purely denotative 
sign. According to Marx—whom Debord constantly quotes, paraphrases 
and ‘detourns’—the relations between commodities on the market are 
abstracted, hieroglyphic ﬁgurations of social relations. This encrypted 
representation is not immediately recognizable as a representation; the 
commodities are fetishes that seem endowed with lives of their own, and 
only thorough analysis shows that they represent a social reality.
It is intriguing that Marx appropriated the term ‘fetish’ from 
Enlightenment mythology: as a young man, he had read de Brosses’s 
Du Culte des dieux fétiches (1760), described by its author as an attempt 
to look at the fundamental causes of myth, which had seemed an 
25 Guy Debord and Gil Wolman, ‘Mode d’emploi du détournement’, in Les Lèvres 
Nues, no. 8, May 1956, p. 2. English translation by Ken Knabb, available at www.
cddc.vt.edu/sionline/presitu/usersguide.html.
26 Debord, La Société du Spectacle [1967], Paris 1992, p. 15.
27 Occasionally, Barthes uses ‘representation’ to refer to images; Mythologies, 
p. 188.
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‘indecipherable chaos’ to most modern observers.28 De Brosses argued 
that primitive people worship actual objects and animals as gods; rather 
than representing or symbolizing gods, they are gods in the eyes of the 
believers, just as commodities appear to be alive and endowed with cer-
tain qualities in the eyes of the commodity fetishist. Of course, in actual 
fact they represent social relations among people, but this is disavowed. 
Contrary to the fetishes of the ‘primitives’ as interpreted by de Brosses, 
commodity fetishes therefore do represent something else, but the fet-
ishist does not realize this. De Brosses supposed that fetishism was the 
most original and primitive form of myth, predating Greek and even 
Egyptian mythology. By describing the commodity as a fetish, Marx thus 
deﬁned it as a creature of myth—capitalist modernity making a dialecti-
cal leap into the mythical. Debord and Raoul Vaneigem underlined the 
mythical component of capitalism even more strongly, while at the same 
time emphasizing that capitalism differs from the mythic order of old, 
deﬁned by Debord as a ‘unitary construction of thought’ that naturalizes 
the social order and relates it to the cosmic order.29
Situationist theory differentiates between the uniﬁed and unifying myth 
of traditional societies and the spectacle as its less stable modern suc-
cessor: ‘Spectacle is nothing but desacralized and parcellized myth.’30 
The si’s conception of myth is, in a sense, more romantic and conserva-
tive than Barthes’s, and closer to that of Mircea Eliade, who saw myth 
as an organic-hierarchic totality that has been shattered by moderniza-
tion. Only its fragments remain, integrated into the industrial totality of 
the spectacle. While spectacle takes on the role of myth in glossing the 
contradictions and antagonisms in society, it is a totality made up of frag-
ments. It unites the separated elements, but as separated. In this sense, 
the spectacle as a fetishistically disavowed representation of social rela-
tions is also a representation of myth. Modernity indeed reverts into myth, 
but myth is not quite what it used to be.
From a Debordian point of view the destruction of spectacular myth and 
its fetishist illusions cannot be achieved by a mere artistic appropriation 
28 Charles de Brosses, Du Culte des dieux fétiches, ou Parallèle de l’ancienne Religion de 
l’Egypte avec la Religion actuelle de Nigritie [1760], Paris 1988, p. 9. On Marx and de 
Brosses see Karl-Heinz Kohl, Die Macht der Dinge: Geschichte und Theorie sakraler 
Objekte, München 2003, p. 92.
29 Debord, La Société du Spectacle, p. 127.
30 Raoul Vaneigem, ‘Banalités de base (II)’, in Internationale Situationniste no. 8, 
January 1963, p. 37.
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of commodity-images. Such art—above all as exempliﬁed by Pop—is 
part of the regime of alienating representations that needs to be 
attacked; it is nothing but an artistic meta-spectacle that does not make 
the slightest contribution to the abolition of spectacle and the realiza-
tion of a future art of ‘constructed situations’, or lived experience. As 
a thrifty attack on the spectacle that does not aspire to artistic status, 
Situationist détournement is the proper way of appropriating spectacular 
myth. But the Situationist utopia is hardly around the corner. The art 
world as meta-spectacle, it can be argued, offers at least some possibili-
ties for practices that diverge from mainstream spectacle. How radical 
these differences prove to be is another matter. If Deleuze is even more 
popular than Debord in today’s art world, it is because Deleuzian rhet-
oric suggests that one can easily escape spectacle’s mythic returns by 
letting a thousand ﬂowers of radical difference bloom. While this may 
not bring an end to the spectacle, it implies there are zones of creation 
that escape its grip.
Sameness and repetition
Drawing on the work of modern mythologists such as Eliade, both 
Debord and Deleuze focused on the temporal dimension of myth. In 
contrast to the modern, historical conception of time, mythic time was 
identiﬁed by Eliade and others as the cyclic repetition of archetypal 
events in a remote, aboriginal past. Debord noted that in advanced capi-
talism, the linear historical time that seemed to characterize modernity 
is replaced by the ‘pseudo-cyclic time’ of the spectacle. Virtually simul-
taneously, Deleuze embarked on his crusade against forms of repetition 
that remain stuck in a mythical, cyclical model, which grounds Being by 
‘folding, bending, re-bending—organizing the order of seasons, years, 
and days’.31 According to Deleuze, this circular repetition of archetypal 
models or ‘originals’ is also fundamental to Plato’s philosophy. In depict-
ing ideas as they are contemplated by ‘circulating souls’ in the heavens, 
and God as a shepherd presiding over the circular movement of the uni-
verse, Plato imposes order on being and separates the true from the 
false, good copies from evil simulacra.32
31 Gilles Deleuze, Différence et répétition, Paris 1968, pp. 350. For Debord see espe-
cially parts v (‘temps et histoire’) and vi (‘le temps spectaculaire’) of La Société du 
Spectacle, pp. 123–64.
32 Deleuze, Différence, p. 86.
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Deleuze takes up the cause of the unjustly maligned simulacrum, which 
promises a non-Platonic, non-mythic repetition.
It is repetition which ruins and degrades us, but it is repetition which can save 
us and allow us to escape from the other repetition . . . To the eternal return 
as reproduction of something always already-accomplished, is opposed the 
eternal return as resurrection, a gift of the new, of the possible.33
Plato’s mythic version of repetition exhibits the manifest content of the 
eternal return. There is, however, another form of repetition hidden in 
the eternal return, its latent content, made explicit by Nietzsche.34 If the 
eternal return is truly eternal, then there is no foundation, just endless 
repetition that cannot claim an origin; it is repetition without model, 
without concept—repetition not as representation, but as the produc-
tion of difference. Deleuze identiﬁes representation with the copying of 
models, and hence with mythical repetition; in this respect mass culture 
as a culture of clichés remains in thrall to myth.35 Art can appropriate 
these representations and turn them into something else: in the late six-
ties, Deleuze mentioned Pop as an example of an art that ﬁnds its point 
of departure in the artiﬁcial—le factice—which can turn into the simu-
lacrum. ‘The artiﬁcial is always a copy of a copy, which must be pushed 
to the point where it changes its nature and turns into a simulacrum (the 
moment of Pop art).’36
Deleuze’s remark has something to tell us about Warhol. For Warhol 
indeed emphasized the second-degree nature of his images and often 
repeated them in grids to empty out the image, creating an exhilarat-
ing void. But a Deleuzian analysis of his oeuvre would tend to overlook 
the complex interplay within it between the ‘reproduction of something 
always already-accomplished’ and ‘the eternal return as resurrection, a 
gift of the new, of the possible’. Warhol was an ardent fetishist, a believer 
in the mythic commodity. His repetitions reinforce the images of the 
spectacle, and bring them into question precisely by doing so. While 
Deleuze’s model of ‘bad’ repetition giving birth to ‘good’ repetition is 
33 Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam, Minneapolis 1986, p. 131.
34 Différence, pp. 37, 92, 168, 380–81.
35 Deleuze, Cinéma 2: L’image-temps, Paris 1985, p. 33.
36 Deleuze, Logique du sens, Paris 1969, p. 307.
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suggestive, it is also too abstract and potentially euphoric. For it implies 
that ‘bad’ repetition—producing only relative difference, which remains 
in thrall to identity—can effortlessly change into ‘good’ repetition and 
pure, positive difference without a model.37 This vision is far too opti-
mistic. The complex dialectical interplay of different forms of repetition 
does not necessarily end in the triumph of Deleuze’s favourite.
Inside myth
In 1981 Warhol published a print portfolio called Myths, featuring the 
likes of Howdy Doody, Superman, Warhol himself, and the witch from 
The Wizard of Oz. The last was not based on an ofﬁcial publicity still, 
as were many of Warhol’s sixties works. It was a new photograph of the 
actress from the original ﬁlm, who lived in Warhol’s area. In the six-
ties Warhol had been relatively unencumbered by copyright problems, 
but by this time he preferred taking his own photographs to prevent 
legal trouble.38 The portfolio’s title clearly reﬂects the ever more generic 
use of the term ‘myth’. In contrast to Barthes, and in common with its 
usage in the mass media, Warhol employed it in a positive sense. So 
it is not entirely surprising that, while October critics were presenting 
the appropriation artist as a Barthesian mythologist, Warhol was gener-
ally regarded by then as a rather dubious ﬁgure, an overly commercial 
has-been who hobnobbed with Imelda Marcos. The exception among 
critics was Benjamin Buchloh, and among artists Louise Lawler. Since 
the 1980s, Lawler has made numerous photographs of works by Warhol 
not only in museums, but also in auction houses and collector’s homes 
and corporations—the witch from the Myths series appearing in a sterile 
boardroom. Lawler’s practice of Warhol appropriation and contextualiza-
tion seems like an attempt to come to terms with the failed encounter 
37 See, for example, Elaine Sturtevant’s work, in full Deleuzian ﬂow: ‘The brutal 
truth of the work is that it is not copy / The push and shove of the work is the 
leap from image to concept / The dynamics of the work is that it throws out rep-
resentation.’ Sturtevant, quoted in Udo Kittelmann and Mario Kramer’s preface 
to Sturtevant: The Brutal Truth, Frankfurt am Main 2004, p. 19. The radical differ-
ence to which Sturtevant aspires remains a subjective intention; her repetitions of 
Johns’s Flags or Warhol’s Marilyns are dependent on these famous paintings as if 
on mythic models.
38 Pat Hackett, ed., The Andy Warhol Diaries, New York 1989, p. 354; Barry 
Blinderman, ‘Modern Myths: Andy Warhol’ (1981), in Kenneth Goldsmith, ed., I’ll 
Be Your Mirror: The Selected Andy Warhol Interviews, 1962–1987, New York 2004, 
p. 292.
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between Warhol and Appropriation Art and its critical reception, espe-
cially in October, around 1980.39
The near-silence with which Pop was passed over in discussion of 
Appropriation Art is suspect. It is as if Pop’s embrace of the commodi-
ﬁcation of art was too uncomfortably close to home. It is striking that a 
similar mild version of damnatio memoriae also occurred in the case of 
Situationist détournement. Insofar as this was registered at all, its frontal 
attack on art as a specialized discipline was perceived as a threat. For those 
who defended a critical art, both Pop and Situationism—propaganda for 
and against the spectacle—undermined art: Pop by collapsing the differ-
ence between artistic and other commodities, and the si by demanding 
the abolition of both artistic and other commodities. To these artists and 
critics, Warhol’s sadly radiant Marilyns were as dubious as an image of 
‘Marilyn Monroë’ from the Internationale Situationniste with a caption 
driving home yet again a point about the spectacle.40 Each in its own 
way, both Pop and the si demonstrated that the art world is thoroughly 
implicated in spectacular neo-myth, not its principled antagonist. Both 
can serve as a corrective for the tendency to idealize art as inherently 
critical. What is disavowed by much Barthesian rhetoric—both around 
1980 and today—as well as by celebration of difference among freestyle 
Deleuzians is the attraction of the commodity and the artist’s entangle-
ment in myth. Even the si’s secession from spectacle could never be 
truly complete. Is there not something of the mater dolorosa even in 
the small picture of Marilyn Monroe on the pages of the Internationale 
Situationniste? And was this particular image not chosen, at least in part, 
for its poignancy?
Douglas Crimp doubted that critical reﬂection on culture could 
use a procedure that is an important part of that same culture—as 
appropriation undoubtedly is. Yet could not critical projects make use of 
precisely such a ubiquitous strategy for a reﬂexive practice that acknowl-
edges its own implication in spectacle and myth? Some appropriations 
may end up reinforcing myths. Second-degree mythology may indeed 
become a pseudo-critical, impotent pretension, still dominated by the 
myths it claims to debunk. It can also become its own myth: the myth of 
39 See Jack Bankowsky, ‘Does Louise Lawler Make You Cry?’, in Louise Lawler and 
Others, pp. 75–90.
40 See p. 19 of Internationale Situationniste, no. 8 (January 1963).
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appropriation as intrinsically radical, or productive of radical difference. 
For ‘criticality’ is only to a limited extent a result of the artist’s subjec-
tive intentions. Nor is it a stable attribute of any image or text. Rather, it 
is something that results from the use of a text or image by an artist or 
critic, or other viewers. Apparent criticality can at any moment turn out 
to be a form of complicity, something seemingly different and new that 
is in fact just cleverly repackaged identity.
The dialectical whims of appropriation have barely begun to be exam-
ined. The theories of myth that informed the various discourses and 
practices considered here are in many ways anachronisms in contem-
porary intellectual life. But a critical re-evaluation and reactivation of 
the historical forms of mythological critique, and of artistic mythology, 
could help break open this present and regain the initiative. Time is 
running out. At the very moment that contemporary consumers are 
celebrated as happy hackers, ever more fundamentalist copyright legis-
lation is creating taboos that will make even partial and ephemeral 
realizations of a true mythology of difference exceedingly difﬁcult.
